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Usurping Democracy and the Attempts to Ban
Hydraulic Fracturing
William E. Sparks
Malinda Morain
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution guarantees every State, “a Republican
Form of Government.”1 In other words, a system of government in which
the people hold sovereign power, not through direct democracy, but
through elected representatives who exercise that power.2 The founding
fathers recognized many of the inherent issues with a direct democracy,
including the threat of an impassioned majority imposing its will on the
rights of a minority. As stated in the Federalist Papers:
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt
by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result
from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check
the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious
individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found
incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and
have in general been as short in their lives as they have been
violent in their deaths.3
Although the founders originally implemented a system of
representative democracy in the U.S., direct democracy found a place in
the country. Direct democracy in the U.S. had its start with the Progressive
political movement in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, mostly in the
western states. At this time, western U.S. territories were seeking
statehood. The Progressives were concerned with the large, wealthy
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political machines controlling the democratic process. During the
constitutional process for these states, the drafters utilized elements of
direct democracy—as opposed to the representative democracy that had
dominated the political atmosphere in the late 18th and 19th Centuries—
to build the structure of state governments.
These created effective governments by incorporating elements of
direct democracy, primarily through populists’ passing of legislation,
constitutional amendments, and referendums on existing laws and
policies. It is not the intent of this article to claim otherwise. As the
Progressives realized at the turn of the 19th Century, direct democracy can
serve as a useful check on elected officials and the laws they pass.
However, it is not proper to use direct democracy as a tool for a vocal
minority when that minority’s attempts to overrule the majority within the
representative system fail.
The Progressives originally used direct democracy in America as a
check on inactivity and corruption. While this was the original intent of
direct democracy in the U.S, it is neither what drives the utilization of
direct democracy today, nor how direct democracy has been used by the
anti-oil and gas industry advocates.
This article briefly examines the history of direct democracy,
discusses several representative states’ legislative and regulatory
processes to regulate domestic oil and gas development, including
hydraulic fracturing, and analyzes the attempts by anti-oil and gas groups
to use direct democracy to usurp the founders’ fundamental democratic
process. This article also discusses the political efforts to introduce
superfluous oil and gas regulation through direct democracy and argues
that direct democracy, while a legitimate governmental tool, is
inappropriately used by special interest groups to drive an anti-industry
agenda. This misuse effectively drives a “common passion” incompatible
with personal security or the rights of property—one unfounded in science
and at odds with the republic form of government established by our
founding fathers.
Colorado is the preeminent example of the use of direct democracy to
usurp representational democracy in an effort to implement regulations of
the oil and gas industry, including the regulation of hydraulic fracturing.
This is illustrated by numerous attempts to implement “local control” of
oil and gas development, the litigation over the ballot initiatives and local
bans on hydraulic fracturing, and other efforts by members of an anti-oil
and gas movement to use processes of direct democracy to usurp
representational democracy and to unilaterally overturn the process
implemented to regulate oil and gas.
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I. STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
The development of oil and gas in the U.S., including hydraulic
fracturing, has a long history. During that time, federal, state, and local
governments have imposed a multitude of laws, rules, regulations, and
have established several administrative agencies dedicated to regulating,
permitting, and overseeing oil and gas development—including hydraulic
fracturing. This section will provide a brief background on the use of
hydraulic fracturing and a summary of some of the various laws,
regulations, and rules governing the oil and gas industry.
A. History and Overview of Hydraulic Fracturing
Numerous scientific papers, news articles, and at least two popular
books address the history of the hydraulic fracturing process and its
development in the U.S.4 This brief background on the technology and the
surrounding legislative history will not address all of the facts and history
behind its development.
Hydraulic fracturing, commonly referred to as “fracing” or “fracking,”
is the process of creating small fractures in underground geological
formations by injecting fluids and a proppant, such as sand, to allow oil or
natural gas to flow into a wellbore, thereby increasing production.5 The
process was first utilized in the 1940s by Stanolind Oil, and its use
expanded domestic oil and gas production in the 1950s.6 Use of hydraulic
fracturing processes extended into Colorado in the 1970s, where most of
the remaining oil and gas formations were not accessible using
conventional drilling techniques.7

4. See, e.g., GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE FRACKERS: THE OUTRAGEOUS INSIDE
STORY OF THE NEW BILLIONAIRE WILDCATTERS (2013); RUSSELL GOLD, THE BOOM:
HOW FRACKING IGNITED THE AMERICAN ENERGY REVOLUTION AND CHANGED THE
WORLD (2015).
5. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, Frequently Asked Questions
About Hydraulic Fracturing, cogcc.state.co.us/Announcements/Hot_Topics
/Hydraulic_Fracturing/Frequent_Questions_about_Hydraulic%20Fracturing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HG8-TJMF] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
6. Daniel R. Cahoy, Joel Gehman & Zhen Lei, Fracking Patents: The
Emergence of Patents as Information-Containment Tools in Shale Drilling, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 279, 283-284 (2013).
7. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, Frequently Asked Questions
About Hydraulic Fracturing, cogcc.state.co.us/Announcements/Hot_Topics
/Hydraulic_Fracturing/Frequent_Questions_about_Hydraulic%20Fracturing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CF4E-DES6] (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
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Technological advances in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing
have spawned an “American Energy Renaissance.”8 According to the
Colorado School of Mines Potential Gas Committee, oil and gas resources
have increased 27% since 2005 to 2,384 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) annually,
with natural gas production up 26% since 2005 to 6.7 Tcf annually.9 The
U.S. oil and gas industry produced over 3 billion barrels of oil in 2014,
and crude oil reserves are estimated to be at their highest levels since
1988.10 Technological advances in horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing are the two most important reasons for these increases in
production and reserves.11
B. History of Oil and Gas Regulations in the United States
The claim that oil and gas development—specifically, hydraulic
fracturing—is an unregulated practice is contradicted by voluminous
federal, state, and local directives and exhaustive permitting
requirements.12 Numerous studies provide evidence that the oil and gas
industry is one of the most highly regulated practices in the U.S.13 As
discussed infra, the development, implementation, and enforcement of
8. WESTERN ENERGY ALL., Industry’s Technological Innovation Is Driving
America’s Energy Renaissance, westernenergyalliance.org/knowledge-center
/technology [https://perma.cc/22TB-PXNU] (last visited Mar. 22 2017).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. AM. PETROLEUM INST., Hydraulic Fracturing: Unlocking America’s Natural
Gas Resources (Feb. 2017), api.org/~/media/Files/Oil-and-Natural-Gas/HydraulicFracturing-primer/Hydraulic-Fracturing-Primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R4D4NGFW].
12. See, e.g., Katherine Toan, Not Under My Backyard: The Battle Between
Colorado and Local Governments Over Hydraulic Fracturing, 26 COLO. NAT. RES.,
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 64 (2015) (“Fracking currently operates within a sixtyyear old regulatory system that was designed to maximize production with little regard
for environmental or health impacts ”).
13. WESTERN ENERGY ALL., Regulatory, westernenergyalliance.org
/knowledge-center/regulatory [https://perma.cc/72NH-2VZV] (last visited Mar. 22,
2017); Patrick McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, The McLaughlin–Sherouse List:
The Ten-Most Regulated Industries of 2014, George Mason Univ.: Mercatus Center
(Jan. 21, 2016), mercatus.org/publication/mclaughlin-sherouse-list-10-mostregulated-industries-2014 [https://perma.cc/NEQ8-52XV] (referencing the
RegData database); Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory
Costs on Small Firms, SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (2010), sba.gov/sites/default/files
/The%20Impact%20of%20Regulatory% 20Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20
%28Full%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7JA-GJPN]; W. Mark Crain & Nicole V.
Crain, The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S. Economy, Manufacturing and
Small Business, NAT’L ASS’N OF MFR. (2014), nam.org /Special/Total-Cost-ofRegulation.aspx?utm_source=nam&utm_medium=alias&utm_campaign=CostofR
egulation [https://perma.cc/PRA6-N2JR].
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state-level regulations, including those imposed as part of a permitting
process, is the proper place to address the anti-oil and gas groups’ concerns
regarding the protection of other resources. This is consistent with the
constitutionally guaranteed republic form of government and the nature of
the industry.
Hydraulic fracturing is governed by numerous federal, state, and local
regulations. For example, at the federal level, the Clean Water Act (CWA)
and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) regulate surface discharges, storm
water runoff, and underground injection of fluids from drilling sites.14
Additionally, the Clean Air Act limits air emissions from sources related
to drilling and production, and the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) requires that exploration and production on federal lands be
thoroughly analyzed for environmental impacts. Further, the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) ensures protection to threatened and endangered
species from impacts due to exploration and production on federal lands.15
In addition, states are charged with implementing regulations of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with oversight by the agency.
Moreover, states can adopt more protective standards if they so choose.
State-by-state regulation makes sense due to the various regional and
state-specific characteristics of oil and gas development activities,
including geology, hydrology, climate, population density, and
economics. For example, Colorado, the site of much of the anti-industry
movement’s activity, has the most comprehensive state regulations and
oversight in the U.S. Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
(COGCC) Rule 205, enacted in December 2011, requires comprehensive
public disclosure of the identity of chemicals used, their concentration, as
well as the volume of water used by developers in hydraulic fracturing
treatments.16 In 2013, Colorado approved the most rigorous statewide
mandatory groundwater sampling and monitoring rules in the U.S.17 That
same year, Colorado adopted some of the most restrictive setback rules in
the nation. These included restrictive rules regarding mandatory lighting

14. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES:A PRIMER (Apr. 2009).
15. Id. at 38–39.
16. See COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, 200 Series: General Rules,
cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Rules/LATEST/200Series.pdf [https://perma.cc
/69GU-XW2X] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (referencing Rule 205 on access to
records).
17. See COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, Rule 609: Statewide
Groundwater Baseline Sampling and Monitoring (2013), cogcc.state.co.us/COGIS
_Help/SampleData.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9S6-75FP] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
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and fugitive dust abatement measures.18 The COGCC also instituted
rulemaking to update the state’s Sensitive Wildlife Habitat Maps and
Restricted Surface Occupancy Maps to monitor and protect Colorado’s
wildlife.19
In 2014, Colorado imposed additional spill reporting requirements,
which required disclosure of spills within twenty-four hours to State
officials, local governments, and surface landowners.20 Concurrently, the
state also passed precedent-setting rules regarding air emissions, including
leak detection and repair, storage tank regulations, and expanded
applicability of the non-attainment area rules to include the entire state.21
In 2015, the COGCC released updated regulations that increased the
penalties for violations of COGCC rules and permits that the COGCC
could impose. This was done in response to concerns from the public that
the COGCC’s penalty and fine structure was inadequate.22
In addition, Colorado requires: notice to landowners and local
governments of hydraulic fracturing activities;23 regulation of well casing
and cementing;24 monitoring of pressures during stimulations;25 pit
permitting, lining, and monitoring; and secondary containment.26 Further,
Colorado imposes on hydraulic fracturing the same rules and regulations
18. See COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, 800 Series Aesthetic and
Noise Control Regulations, http://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Rules/LATEST
/800Series.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DZR-L996] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017)
(referencing specifically Rules 803 and 805.c.).
19. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, Rules & Regulations,
cogcc.state.co.us/reg.html#/rules (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (citing the 1200
Rules Series on Protection of Wildlife Resources, Appendix VII on Restricted
Surface Occupancy Maps, and Appendix VIII on Sensitive Wildlife Habitat
Maps).
20. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, 900 Series: Exploration and
Production Waste Management, cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Rules/LATEST
/900series.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3XK-9AC5] (last visited on Mar. 22, 2017)
(referencing Rule 906(b) on the reporting of spills or releases) [hereinafter COGCC
900 Series].
21. See COLO. DEP’T OF PUBLIC HEALTH & ENV’T, Oil & Gas Air Emissions
Requirements,
colorado.gov/pacific/cdphe/summary-oil-and-gas-emissionsrequirements [https://perma.cc/C9K9-YVFK] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
22. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission Enforcement Guidance and Penalty Policy (Jan. 2015),
cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Policies/Final%20Enforcement_Guidance%20-%
20Jan%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZJP-JHL4].
23. See COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, 300 Series: Drilling,
Development, Production and Abandonment, https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg
/Rules/LATEST/300Series.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HAN-D3LG] (last visited Apr. 16,
2017) (referencing Rule 305.f).
24. Id. (referencing Rule 317).
25. Id. (referencing Rule 341).
26. COGCC 900 Series, supra note 20 (referencing Rules 903–04).
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that govern conventional oil and gas development. These regulations
specifically address the risks of hydraulic fracturing touted by anti-oil and
gas industry advocates, who claim that hydraulic fracturing poses an
unacceptable risk to drinking water. Recent studies by the EPA and others
have shown no evidence of systematic contamination from fracturing on
water supplies.27
Despite widespread public acceptance of domestic oil and gas
development and the existence of federal, state, and local laws,
regulations, and permitting requirements, hydraulic fracturing is subject to
a continuing onslaught of public criticism from a loud and outspoken
minority. Currently, every state, with the exception of New York and
Maryland, allows oil and gas development utilizing hydraulic fracturing.
However, the vocal minority continues to push for a ban on domestic oil
and gas development through statewide bans on hydraulic fracturing or by
advocating for “local control” to effectuate the same result. Notably, when
these groups could not get duly elected representatives of their local, state,
and federal government to ban the process and attempts at local control
were struck down by a majority of the voters, the anti-industry groups
needed a different, unconventional approach.
II.

DEMOCRACY AND THE GUARANTEE OF A REPUBLICAN FORM OF
GOVERNMENT
Although founded as a republic with numerous checks and balances,
elements of direct democracy have worked their way into the political
process in the United States. This section briefly discusses the history of
democracy prior to and in the U.S., as well as the increase in the utilization
of tools of direct democracy across many other nations.
A. Classic Democracy
Classic democracy is a system of government in which citizens or
some set of the population of a country elect representatives to form a
governing body.28 In Greek, democracy literally means “rule of the
commoners,” although it is often referred to as “rule of the people” or “rule
of the majority.”29 In ancient Greece, select male citizens elected
27. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL
AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES (FINAL REPORT) (2016).
28. Democracy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
29. Democracy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/democracy?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm
_source=jsonld [https://perma.cc/E2WS-SQV9] (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
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representatives to create the republic which governed by majority rule.
Under a democracy, the electing population as a whole holds the sovereign
power of the government.
In contrast, a republican form of government is one in which officials
elected by a democratic process exercise the power on behalf of the
sovereign people.30 A republican government formed the basis of the U.S.
Constitution and is the form of government that the U.S. eventually
adopted.31
B. American Democracy and Direct Democracy
The U.S. Constitution guarantees “every state in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.”32 The ancient Greeks and Romans
considered a republic as a group of elected, governing officials; and thus,
the Greek and Roman’s republic excluded any government resembling
that of a “monarch.” Given the history of the American Revolutionary War
and King George, the founders of the U.S. also excluded any form of
government resembling a monarchy.
The republican form of government was reiterated in the Federalist
Papers, with the idea that a “chosen body of citizens . . . will be least likely
to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”33
State and local governments are no different. Every state in the U.S.
consist of a governor and legislative body elected by the people of each state.
Also, nearly every county, city, and municipality includes a city council,
county commission, or other representative entity elected by the citizens of
that local government who are chosen to govern that specific unit.
In 1898, South Dakota became the first state to implement direct
democracy by creating a mechanism for citizens to draft and place a ballot
initiative up for popular vote.34 Twenty-seven states followed suit in
allowing some form of direct democracy with Massachusetts becoming
the twenty-eighth and final state to adopt a process for ballot initiatives in
1918.35 The direct democracy movement of the late 19th Century and early
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Classic Democracy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 20–21 (James Madison).
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, State I&R, iandrinstitute.org/states.cfm [https://perma.cc
/V2HA-ZKBE] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). The Initiative & Referendum Institute
(IRI) at the University of Southern California is an educational organization that
indicates it is non-partisan and dedicated to the referendum and initiative process. The
IRI also includes a list of the 28 states that have direct democracy processes, either
through referendums or ballot initiatives. Id.
35. Id.
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20th Century became a tool of the progressives and populists in their attempts
at governmental reform.36 The Progressive Movement feared wealthy
political machines that could out-govern the true will of the people.37
The Progressive agenda of combating poverty, progressive taxation,
social reforms, and combating industrialization could only be achieved—
or so the Progressives thought—without the use of their duly elected
officials.38 It was not solely a way to give average citizens a voice against
the control of “moneyed groups over elected officials” as some have
suggested.39 The Progressives were fighting big money, corruption,
privileged wealth, and a check on the new social forces mainly created to
solve a problem of a large number of smaller interest groups that
individually could not affect the legislature.40
Across the U.S., there are now multiple distinct mechanisms that are
loosely included within “direct democracy.” Although each state utilizing
direct democracy has different specifics, the most important mechanisms
to this article are ballot measures.41 Generally, a “ballot measure” is any
voting choice on a ballot that is not a choice to select a candidate for
office.42 There are two basic categories of ballot measures: (1) ballot
initiatives; and (2) referendums.43 Ballot initiatives are generally a citizendrafted proposed law for voters to approve or disapprove, although some
states require legislative approval before the citizen-drafted language
reaches the ballot.44 If the voters approve of the initiative, it becomes part
of that state or local government’s law.45 Twenty-four states have some
sort of initiative process.46
36. See, e.g., DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE
CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY (2000).
37. See Nathanial A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy:
Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2
MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11 (1997).
38. See id. at 22 (discussing the Progressive movement, its history, and the
underlying purposes of direct democracy at the turn of the 19th Century).
39. See, e.g., Jessica A. Levinson, Taking the Initiative: How to Save Direct
Democracy, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1019 (2014).
40. See Persily, supra note 37, at 27, 29.
41. See THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, Comparison of Statewide Initiative Processes ,
iandrinstitute.org/docs/A_Comparison_of_Statewide_IandR_Processes.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/9T8A-BEJU] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (detailing state-by-state
summaries of direct democracy methods) [hereinafter, Comparison of Statewide
Initiative Processes].
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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A constitutional initiative is a method to directly or indirectly amend
a state constitution through citizen-drafted language. A “direct initiative
amendment” is a constitutional amendment directly voted on by the
eligible voters for approval.47 An “indirect initiative amendment” is
submitted to the state legislature for review.48 If the state legislature
approves the proposed constitutional amendment, the constitutional
amendment will be placed on the ballot for voter approval. Of the eighteen
states that have a constitutional initiative process,49 sixteen utilize the
direct initiative amendment process and two utilize the indirect initiative
amendment process.50 Many states also have a similar initiative process to
introduce state laws, rather than constitutional amendments.
Referendums are generally described as a process in which, by popular
vote, the citizens can approve or reject laws or other amendments to the
constitution or laws already approved by the state legislature.51 Twentythree states allow referendums in some form.52
Although the Constitution guarantees the right of republican, rather
than a direct form of government where elected officials are—in theory—
making and enforcing laws, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to determine
the constitutionality of state laws authorizing direct democracy.53
Both sides of the argument—those in support of ballot initiatives and
direct democracy and those opposed—argue that the process is too greatly
influenced by special interests, money, and skewed by a small dissatisfied,
vocal few that cannot get the government to listen to their concerns.54
C. World-Wide Rise of Populism
Populism is not just on the rise in the U.S., but is resurging across
democratic nations as evidenced by the increase of populist parties and
leaders across the democratic world—i.e., Marine Le Pen’s Front
Nationale in France, Matteo Salvini’s Northern League in Italy, Geert

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Comparison of Statewide Initiative Processes, supra note 41.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Pac. States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150–51 (1912) (holding that
whether a state has a republican form of government is a political question not subject
to judicial review).
54. See, e.g., Dina E. Conlin, The Ballot Initiative in Massachusetts: The Fallacy
of Direct Democracy, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2004); Sherman J. Clark,
A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434 (1998).
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Wilder’s Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, Evo Morales in Bolivia. 55
In Europe, populist parties’ average share of the vote in national and
European parliamentary elections has more than doubled since the 1960s,
from around 5.1% to 13.2%.56 In Britain, the United Kingdom (UK)
Independence Party, through its populist rhetoric, fueled the calling and
eventual approval of the European Union Brexit referendum.57
In the 2016 U.S. election, candidates on both sides of the political
spectrum drew on populist ideals with great success. Democratic Presidential
hopeful Bernie Sanders articulated an anti-big corporation, anti-big bank, and
anti-elite rhetoric, consistent with the Populist Party of the 1890s and
surpassed all expectations in his bid for the democratic election against Hillary
Clinton.58 Although drawing from a different political base, Donald Trump’s
criticism of intellectual elites, scientific experts, and elected officials in part
secured him the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.59
Because populism has experienced such a rebirth, the use of populist
forms of government, such as the referendum and initiative process, can
serve as the tool of an impassioned group to restrict the rights of any
minority. For example, direct democracy has been used to strip voting
rights from African Americans, prohibit Asians from owning land, and
restrict employment of immigrants.60 Therefore, the issues of use and
misuse of direct democracy and the rise of populism is not restricted solely
to the oil and gas industry.
III. ATTEMPTS TO BAN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AT STATE AND LOCAL
LEVELS
For numerous reasons, the federal government has largely left
regulation of oil and gas to each state. The federal government’s power to
regulate activities on private lands and the regulation of natural resource
development has been left to each state mainly out of respect for the state’s
interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.61
Largely due to technological advances and increased oil and gas
development, a perception began that oil and gas, particularly hydraulic
55. See Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of
Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash (John F. Kennedy Sch. of
Gov’t, Working Paper No. RWP16-026), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2818659 [https://perma.cc/3B45-HBTV].
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id.
60. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVES, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 92–93 (1989).
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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fracturing, was unregulated. With this misperception, the anti-oil and gas
movement began pushing for more regulations because of the widespread
misinformation that oil and gas development will irreparably harm
drinking water and cause widespread public health issues.62 Ultimately,
this started the push in oil and gas producing states to further regulate oil
and gas activity and has even included the use of direct democracy.
Examples of attempts to ban oil and gas development across the country
highlight the push to utilize direct democracy after failing to achieve
prohibitions through the legislative process.
A. Federal Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing
Federal regulation of hydraulic fracturing on federal and Indian land
is a relatively new concept. Several members of Congress have introduced
legislation that would amend the Mineral Leasing Act to prohibit lessees
from hydraulic fracturing oil and gas wells on public lands.63 This
legislation did not make it past the House Subcommittee on Energy and
Mineral Resources.64 Consequently, no federal environmental legislation
currently prohibits hydraulic fracturing; instead, Congress has largely left
regulation of the process to the states.
Believing that the congressional exclusion of authority to regulate
fracking in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was limited to the SDWA, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) published a final rule regulating
hydraulic fracturing in March 2015.65 BLM’s rule sought to provide
disclosure to the public of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing;
strengthen regulations related to well-bore integrity; and address issues
related to water produced during oil and gas operations.66 Numerous states,
industry representatives, and the Ute Indian Tribe sued to enjoin the
regulation, claiming, amongst other things, that the rule exceeded BLM’s
statutory jurisdiction and authority.67
In June 2016, U.S. District Court Judge Skavdahl set aside the BLM
regulations, stating that the regulations exceed the authority granted to the
62. See Katherine Toan, Not Under My Backyard: The Battle Between Colorado
and Local Governments Over Hydraulic Fracturing, 26 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 66 (2015).
63. Protect Our Public Lands Act, H.R. 1902, 114th Cong. (2015).
64. Id.
65. See Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128–
16,222 (Mar. 26, 2015).
66. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 2:15–CV–043-SWS; No. 2:15–CV–
041-SWS, 2015 WL 3509415, at *8–9 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016) (citing 77 Fed. Reg.
27,691 (May 11, 2012)).
67. Id. at *11.

2017]

USURPING DEMOCRACY

325

agency by Congress.68 Specifically, Judge Skavdahl ruled that Congress
did not intend to grant authority to federal agencies to regulate fracking,
as evidenced by Congress’s explicit removal of “the only source of
specific federal agency authority over fracking” with the Energy Policy
Act of 2005.69 The government filed an appeal of Judge Skavdahl’s
decision on June 24, 2016. That appeal is now pending. Based on the lack
of a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for non-federal lands, the
power to regulate hydraulic fracturing is properly vested in the states.
The following section is not intended to be an exclusive list of all of
the states’ actions, including direct democracy actions affecting hydraulic
fracturing. There are many other states that have used both representative
democracy and state and local initiatives to attempt to regulate or prohibit
hydraulic fracturing.70
B. Colorado
The COGCC has regulated oil and gas in the state of Colorado since
the passage of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act (OGCA). The
Colorado Supreme Court has concluded that the ultimate authority for oil
and gas regulation, including the ability to hydraulically fracture wells,
lies with the COGCC under the OGCA.71
In 2012, the democratically controlled Colorado State Assembly took
up proposed legislation that would provide local governments with
increased control over oil and gas development and operations.72
68. Id. at *12.
69. Id. at *11.
70. For example, Maryland has taken steps to ban hydraulic fracturing both
locally and at the state level. However, these attempts have not used direct democracy.
Maryland’s legislature passed a bill in 2015 that placed a moratorium on hydraulic
fracturing until October 2017. Local governments have also taken actions to ban
hydraulic fracturing. In 2016, Prince George’s County voted on an ordinance to
prohibit hydraulic fracturing in the County. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
COUNTY CODE SUBTITLE 27, PART 2, DIV. 4, SUBDIVISION 1, § 27-115(a)(2) (2016),
municode.com/library/md/prince_george’s_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?node
Id=PTIITI17PULOLAPRGECOMA_SUBTITLE_27ZO_PT2GE_DIV4REAPALZ
O_SD1US_S27-115PRUS [https://perma.cc/ZCJ5-2X2G] (hydraulic fracturing
included in prohibited uses of all county zones).
71. City of Longmont, Colo. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 585
(2016) (stating that the Commission’s rules and regulations evince state control
over numerous aspects of hydraulic fracturing); City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil
& Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586 (2016). See also Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of
Lafayette, 2015 Colo. App. LEXIS 828 (Colo. App. May 28, 2015) (affirming
district court decision finding that Lafayette did not have authority to negate the
authority of the state).
72. Colo. H.R. No. 12-1277, 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (2012).
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However, the bill failed to pass the House Committee on Local
Government due to preemption concerns.73
Undeterred by the bill’s failure, anti-oil and gas groups lobbied for
local governments to ban hydraulic fracturing. Ultimately, after local
citizens voted on proposed prohibitions against development, several
municipalities passed bans and moratoria on the process.74 Believing that
COGCC regulations and the OGCA preempted these local ordinances, the
Colorado Oil and Gas Association sued Longmont and Fort Collins to
enjoin the new ordinances.75 The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately
determined that while there was no express or implied preemption of local
regulation, the local bans and moratoria operationally conflicted with
existing state law.76
After the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the ballot initiativedriven bans were preempted by state law, Boulder ended its five-year
moratorium and instituted one for six months, given the Supreme Court’s
comparison of the length of the Fort Collins moratorium to a ban.77 Two

73. See COLO. HOUSE COMM. ON LOCAL GOV’T LEGISLATIVE SESSION
SUMMARY, colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/12LEGISLocalGovernment.pdf
(last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
74. See, e.g., LONGMONT, COLORADO HOME-RULE CHARTER ART. XVI (2012)
(“It shall hereby be the policy of the City of Longmont that it is prohibited to use
hydraulic fracturing to extract oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons within the City of
Longmont.”), municode.com/library/co/longmont/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId
=PTICH_ARTXVILOPUHESAWEAC [https://perma.cc/A3JJ-5GMD]; FORT
COLLINS, COLORADO CODE § 12-135 (2015) (“The use of hydraulic fracturing to
extract oil, gas or other hydrocarbons, and the storage in open pits of solid or liquid
wastes and/or flowback created in connection with the hydraulic fracturing process,
are prohibited within the City.”), municode.com/library/co/fort_collins/codes
/municipal_code?nodeId=CH12HEEN_ARTVIIIHYFR [https://perma.cc/A3JJ5GMD]; see also BROOMFIELD, COLORADO HOME-RULE CHARTER CHAPTER XX:
PROHIBITION ON HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (2013), municode.com/library/co
/broomfield/codes/municipal_code?nodeId=HORUCHBRCO_CHXXPRHYFR
[https://perma.cc/LM4U-NJMN]; LAFAYETTE, COLORADO HOME-RULE CHARTER §
2.3 (2013) (making it unlawful to engage in the extraction of oil or gas within the City
of Lafayette), municode.com/library/co/lafayette/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId
=CH_CHIIMUPO [https://perma.cc/85DU-SU6X]; BOULDER, COLORADO
ORDINANCE NO. 7915 (2013) (extending Ordinance No. 7907 imposing a five-year
moratorium on hydraulic fracturing), www-static.bouldercolorado.gov/docs
/Ordinance_7915_Fracking-1-201308271458.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VF8-BNP6].
75. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 577; City of Fort Collins, 369 P.3d at 589.
76. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 585; City of Fort Collins, 369 P.3d at 594.
77. John Fryar, Boulder County Ends Fracking Moratorium, Imposes Another,
DAILY CAMERA, May 19, 2016, dailycamera.com/news/ci_29914463/bouldercounty-ends-one-fracking-moratorium-imposes-another [https://perma.cc/TB3ZE8WT]; City of Fort Collins, 369 F.3d at 593–94.
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municipalities—Broomfield and Boulder—recently extended their
moratoria.78
As discussed infra, when activists have failed to pass statewide or
permanent restrictions on oil and gas development in the State of
Colorado, they continually have turned to the ballot initiative process.
C. Ohio
Like Colorado, exclusive authority of oil and gas regulation in Ohio,
including operation of oil and gas wells, is granted to the state. In 2004,
Ohio enacted House Bill 278, which amended the Ohio Revised Code
provisions concerning the Division of Mineral Resources Management.79
Specifically, the legislation states that “regulation of oil and gas activities
is a matter of general statewide interest that requires uniform statewide
regulation,” and the provisions are intended to create a “comprehensive
plan with respect to all aspects of the locating, drilling, well stimulation,
completing, and operating of oil and gas wells within this state[.]”80 The
state has subsequently passed legislation to regulate disclosure of
hydraulic fracturing fluids.81 Similar Colorado, legislation has been
introduced—but not passed—that seeks to prohibit hydraulic fracturing.82
After anti-oil and gas industry advocates failed to enact statewide
legislation that would stop hydraulic fracturing, several Ohio cities turned
to direct democracy in an attempt to spur development during the 2014
election. In Athens, Ohio, voters approved the Athens Community Bill of
Rights, which banned hydraulic fracturing within the city limits.83 In so
78. John Fryar, Boulder County Again Extends Moratorium, BROOMFIELD
ENTERPRISE, Dec. 14, 2016, broomfieldenterprise.com/news/ci_30660234/bouldercounty-again-extends-moratorium [https://perma.cc/7DHC-3HJU]; Angela K. Evans,
Broomfield Votes to Adopt Five-Month Moratorium on Oil and Gas Operations,
BOULDER WEEKLY, Dec. 15, 2016, boulderweekly.com/news/broomfield-votes-toadopt-five-month-moratorium-on-oil-and-gas-operations/ [https://perma.cc/UQ484Z8D].
79. Ohio H.B. No. 278, 125th Gen. Assemb. (2004) (effective as of Sept. 16,
2004).
80. Id. (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02).
81. See, e.g., Ohio S.B. No. 315, 129th Gen. Assemb. (2012) (requiring
disclosure of hydraulic fracturing fluids).
82. Ohio S.B. No. 213, 129th Gen. Assemb. (2011); see also, Ohio H.B. No.
345, 129th Gen. Assemb. (2011) (proposing a halt on hydraulic fracturing while
its effects are being studied).
83. See Laura Arenschield, Athens Votes to Ban Fracking, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 2014, dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/11/05/athensvotes-to-ban-fracking.html [https://perma.cc/23PY-V3U9]; City of Athens Fracking
Ban Initiative, Issue 7, BALLOTPEDIA, ballotpedia.org/City_of_Athens_Fracking
_Ban_Initiative [https://perma.cc/6L3V-QDLJ],_Issue_7_(November_2014) (last
visited Mar. 22, 2017).

328

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. V

doing, Athens joined several other Ohio cities that had already passed the
Community Bill of Rights, beginning in 2012, which also banned
hydraulic fracturing within city limits.84 Notably, several additional Ohio
cities have voted against hydraulic fracturing bans.85
In February 2015, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a ruling concerning the
ability of municipalities to regulate drilling of oil and gas wells.86 Similar to
the Colorado Supreme Court’s rulings in Fort Collins and Longmont, the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled that a municipal regulation conflicted with Ohio Revised
Code § 1509.02.87 The Court’s determination that § 1509.02 grants exclusive
authority to the state to “regulate ‘all aspects’ of the location, drilling and
operation of oil and gas wells,”88 meant that “patchwork . . . local . . .
regulations”—including local hydraulic fracturing bans—are prohibited.89
In conjunction with the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling, legislators
recently passed legislation that could prevent communities from trying to
ban hydraulic fracturing.90 This bill allows ballot initiatives to be removed
from the ballot if determined to not be within the scope of the authority of
the municipality.91 The bill was made effective April 6, 2017.92
D. New York
Unlike Colorado and Ohio, hydraulic fracturing in New York has been
banned, although not through utilization of direct democracy. Currently,
there is no state legislation in New York that bans hydraulic fracturing,
although both the New York Assembly and the New York Senate have
introduced bills that would permanently ban hydraulic fracturing in the state.93
84. Bob Downing, Athens is Fifth Ohio Community to Pass Rights-Based
Fracking Ban, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Nov. 5, 2014, ohio.com/blogs/drilling/ohio
-utica-shale-1.291290/athens-is-fifth-ohio-community-to-pass-rights-based-frackingban-1.538281 [https://perma.cc/LXS2-WYYP] (noting that similar bans were passed
in Oberlin, Mansfield, Yellow Springs, and Broadview Heights).
85. See Arenschield, supra note 83 (noting that Youngtown, Kent, and Gates
Mills voted against fracking bans as well).
86. State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 37 N.E.3d 128 (Ohio 2015).
87. Id. at 137–38.
88. Id. at 137.
89. Id. at 140 (O’Donnell concurring); see also Randy Ludlow, Local
Governments Cannot Regulate Fracking, Ohio Supreme Court Rules, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 2015, dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/02/17/SupremeCourt-rules-fracking.html.
90. Ohio H.B. No. 463, 131st Gen. Assemb. (2016).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See N.Y. Assembly Bill A4726, 238th Gen. Assemb. (2015) (prohibiting the
use of hydraulic fracturing in the extraction of oil and gas; introduced on Feb. 5, 2015);
see also N.Y. Senate Bill S883, 238th Gen. Assemb. (2015) (prohibiting the use of
hydraulic fracturing in the extraction of oil and gas; introduced on Jan. 7, 2015).
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However, in June 2015, the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation (NYSDEC) issued a Final Supplemental Generic
Environmental Impact Statement (SGEIS), which concluded that “there
are potential significant adverse environmental and public health impacts
associated with high-volume hydraulic fracturing operations.”94 Based on
this determination, the NYSDEC established an administrative ban on the
hydraulic fracturing process, stating that the Department “will not
establish a high-volume hydraulic fracturing permitting program; that no
individual or site-specific permit applications for wells using high-volume
hydraulic fracturing will be processed; and that high-volume hydraulic
fracturing will be prohibited in New York State.”95
Additionally, local New York governments have passed numerous
municipal bans and moratoria. In June 2014, the New York Court of
Appeals analyzed the ability of local governments to ban hydraulic
fracturing.96 Unlike the Colorado and Ohio Supreme Courts, the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that local zoning authority to ban or place a
moratorium on hydraulic fracturing is not preempted by the New York Oil,
Gas and Solution Mining Law (OGSML), and is therefore permissible.97
Like the other states, the high court of New York stated that municipalities
are allowed to regulate land use as long as it is not inconsistent with state
law.98 However, the Court of Appeals noted that the New York statute
specifically includes Home Rule Laws that empower local governments to
“pass laws both for the ‘protection and enhancement of [their] physical
and visual environment’ . . . and for the ‘government, protection, order,
conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein.’”99
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled that the City of Dryden’s hydraulic
fracturing ban is not preempted by state legislation; instead, the OGSML
only preempts “local laws that purport to regulate the actual operations of
oil and gas activities, not zoning ordinances that restrict or prohibit certain
land uses.”100 Thus, the New York Court of Appeals determined that
zoning regulations prohibiting hydraulic fracturing under the New York
94. N.Y. DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING
REGULATORY PROGRAM: FINDINGS STATEMENT 5 (2015) [hereinafter FINAL
SUPPLEMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT]. For the complete set of final documents,
see N.Y. DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing in
NYS, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/75370.html [https://perma.cc/55UA-3SND]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
95. FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 94, at 41.
96. Matter of Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 23 N.Y.3d 728 (2014).
97. Id.at 753 (2014).
98. Id. at 742.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 746.
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Home Rule Laws are permissible,101 while Ohio and Colorado determined
that the bans are preempted because state legislation specifically allows
and regulates the process. Relying on this ruling, more than 180 local
municipalities have imposed local moratoria on hydraulic fracturing in
New York.102
E. Louisiana
Louisiana does not have a statewide ballot initiative or referendum
process. However, there are state regulations on oil and gas, including
hydraulic fracturing.103 In 2010, St. Tammany Parish passed Ordinance
No. 10-2408, which rezoned unincorporated areas of the Parish.104 In
2014, Helis Oil Company proposed a project to drill an oil well—which
would be hydraulically fractured—in St. Tammany Parish in the
Tuscaloosa Marine Shale.105
In response to Helis’ proposed project, the St. Tammany Parish
Council passed several resolutions during its June 5, 2014, Council
meeting in an effort to prevent the project from moving forward.106
Specifically, the Council passed resolutions: (1) requesting that the
Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation delay a decision on the issuance
of any permits relative to hydraulic fracturing in the Parish; (2) authorizing
counsel to file a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
against the Office of Conservation of the Louisiana Department of Natural
Resources regarding issuance of oil and gas drilling permits in the Parish;
and (3) authorizing counsel to initiate litigation with the Commissioner of
Conservation for the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources to
101. See id. at 754–55.
102. See, e.g., SYRACUSE REVISED GENERAL ORDINANCES CHAPTER 27, ART.
10(1)(a) (“No person, firm, corporation or other entity shall conduct any
Hydrofracking or other exploration for Natural Gas . . . within the territorial
boundaries of the City of Syracuse.”); AUBURN COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 78 OF
2011: MEMORIALIZING THE GOVERNOR AND STATE LEGISLATURE TO BAN
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL GAS WELLS WITHIN
THE OWASCO LAKE WATERSHED (June 2, 2011), s3.amazonaws.com/nysbans/NYS
/frack_actions_auburnny.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX5B-YZL9].
103. See, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. XLIII, pt. XIX, § 118 (2016) (hydraulic
fracture permit and fluid disclosure requirements); § 307 (pit liner and monitoring
requirements); § 109 (regulation of casing and cementing).
104. St. Tammany Parish Gov’t v. Welsh, 199 So.3d 3, 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2016).
105. Robert Rhoden, Proposed Oil and Gas Drilling Near Mandeville Raises
Concerns, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 8, 2014, nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/04
/proposed_oil_and_gas_drilling.html [https://perma.cc/RX7E-B978].
106. See ST. TAMMANY PARISH GOV’T, MINUTES OF ST. TAMMANY PARISH
COUNCIL MEETING (June 5, 2014), stpgov.org/council-agendas/item/download/244
_b2accb5d2fad7ca3b81c477460058688 [https://perma.cc/MY78-LDWV].
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determine the Parish’s zoning authority in conjunction with the state’s
authority to regulate oil and gas exploration in the Parish.107
The Commissioner of the Office of Conservation approved the project
and issued a permit to Helis on December 19, 2014.108 The Parish filed suit
seeking declaratory relief that the Parish zoning designation rendered the
land use allowed with the permit illegal.109 The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Helis and the Commissioner because it
found that state law expressly preempted the zoning ordinances.110 The
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that “a political
subdivision is ‘hereby expressly forbidden . . . to prohibit or in any way
interfere with the drilling of a well . . . by the holder of . . . a [dulyauthorized] permit,’ which clearly and manifestly evinces the legislative
intent to expressly preempt that area of the law.”111
F. Florida
Like New York, Florida’s efforts to ban hydraulic fracturing have not
utilized the direct democracy process. Instead, legislators have introduced
several bills seeking to prohibit the activity.112 These bills specifically
sought to prohibit well stimulation treatments in the state and its adjacent
waters; but, both died in Committees.113 Notably, Senate Bill 166 was
refiled after failing to make it out of Committee during the previous
session.114 Supporters of the oil and gas industry have responded by trying
to pass legislation ensuring state authority over oil and gas regulations.115
The legislation was passed in the House, but ultimately the proposals
failed to make it out of Senate Committees.116
107. Id. at 9–11.
108. Welsh, 199 So.3d at 5.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 10.
112. See Fla. S.B. 166, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2016) (filed on Aug. 24, 2015
and died in committee on Mar. 11, 2016); Fla. H.B. 169, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(2015) (filed on Jan. 5, 2015 and died in committee on Apr. 28, 2015).
113. See Fla. S.B. 166, supra note 112; Fla. H.B. 169, supra note 112.
114. Fla. S.B. 166, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015) (filed Dec. 2, 2014 and died
in committee on May 1, 2015); see also Fla. H.B. 1205, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(2015) (proposing regulations of well stimulation; filed Mar. 1, 2015 and died on
calendar on May 1, 2015); Julie, Dermansky, Battle to Keep Florida Frack-Free
Heats Up, DESMOG (Oct. 31, 2015), desmogblog.com/2015/10/31/battle-keepflorida-frack-free-heating [https://perma.cc/8CDT-GNQV].
115. Fla. H.B. 191, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2016) (filed on Sept. 17, 2015 and
died in committee on Mar. 11, 2016); Fla. S.B. 318, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015)
(filed Sept. 17, 2015 and died in appropriations on Mar. 11, 2016).
116. See Fla. H.B. 191, supra note 115; Fla. S.B. 318, supra note 115.

332

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. V

As state efforts to ban hydraulic fracturing have failed, some
municipalities have taken action to ban the process. For example, the City
Council of Bonita Springs unanimously amended the city’s Land
Development Code on July 15, 2015, to prohibit hydraulic fracturing.117
Other municipalities have also banned hydraulic fracturing or are
considering bans.118
G. California
California is well known for utilizing direct democracy, having led the
nation in numerous reform efforts using ballot initiatives.119 California’s
strong tendency to use ballot initiatives has included hydraulic fracturing
regulation and attempts to prohibit it.
In 2014, the California Senate attempted to pass legislation that would
“prohibit all well stimulation treatments.”120 This bill failed to pass the
Senate.121 However, there is a state regulatory process that regulates
hydraulic fracturing, but without a statewide prohibition, numerous local
governments have attempted to ban hydraulic fracturing both through city
councils and through voter-initiative proposals.122

117. BONITA SPRINGS, FLORIDA LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 4-1380(c)(3)
(2015) (“No person or entity may engage in any oil and gas exploration or
production that utilizes well stimulation within the corporate boundaries of the
City of Bonita Springs.”); see also CITY OF BONITA SPRINGS, FLORIDA, CITY
COUNCIL MINUTES (July 15, 2015), cityofbonitasprings.org/wp-content/uploads
/2015/08/07-15-15-City-Council-Minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVA9-7352].
118. Victoria Bekiempis, Florida City Bans Fracking, NEWSWEEK, July 15,
2015, newsweek.com/florida-city-bans-fracking-do-not-run-embargo-embargoembargo-untilsomething-353047 [https://perma.cc/RQD7-NE3L] (noting that
Coconut Creek, Florida passed a ban); Bill Smith, Estero Will Take Up Fracking
Ban in November, NEWS-PRESS.COM (October 28, 2015, 3:10 PM), newspress.com/story/news/local/estero/2015/10/28/estero-take-up-fracking-bannovember/74733818/ [https://perma.cc/FPC4-Q2LT].
119. History of Initiative and Referendum in California, BALLOTPEDIA,
ballotpedia.org/History_of_Initiative_and_Referendum_in_California (last visited
Mar. 22, 2017); see also CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Initiative Totals by Summary Year
1912–2016, elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov//ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-totals-summaryyear.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ35-KACD] (last visited March 22, 2017).
120. Cal. S.B. 1132, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (2014) (introduced Feb. 20, 2014
and passage refused after third reading on May 29, 2014).
121. CAL. LEG. INFO., S.B. 1132 OIL AND GAS: WELL STIMULATION TREATMENTS
BILL HISTORY (2014), leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill
_id=201320140SB1132 [https://perma.cc/N6GM-TU62].
122. Examples include: San Benito, Mendocino, Santa Barbara County,
Monterey County, Alameda County, Beverley Hills City Council, and so on.
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In the November 2014 election, voters in two counties—San Benito and
Mendocino—approved measures to prohibit hydraulic fracturing.123
Meanwhile, Santa Barbara County voters chose not to ban hydraulic
fracturing.124 In the 2016 election, Monterey County passed Measure Z,
which amended the County General Plan to prohibit the use of land for
hydraulic fracturing treatments, prevent waste water injections and disallow
new wells in the county.125 In July 2016, the Alameda County Board of
Supervisors voted to prohibit hydraulic fracturing in the county.126
Two lawsuits have been filed against Monterey County challenging
Measure Z.127 These lawsuits allege that California state law preempts
Measure Z and that the prohibition violates vested rights and constitutes a
taking of property.128 While the suits are pending, the ban on hydraulic

123. MENDOCINO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA ORDINANCE TITLE 8, § 8.05.030(a)
(2014), municode.com/library/ca/mendocino_county/codes/code_of_ordinances
?nodeId=MECOCO_TIT8PUHESAWE_CH8.05COBIRIMES_S8.05.010DE
[https://perma.cc /MPD6-VYFL] (“It shall be unlawful for any government,
corporation or natural person to engage in the unconventional extraction of
hydrocarbons within Mendocino County.”); SAN BENITO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA
CODE § 19.21.031 (2014), http://www.amlegal.com/?s=san+benito [https://perma
.cc/K83N-SSNM] (provision entitled “Protect Our Water and Health: Ban Fracking
Initiative”). The San Benito Code mentions the provision for banning fracking in §
19.21.032 as § 19.21.031, but § 19.21.031 still says “reserved.”
124. COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA ELECTIONS, Santa Barbara County
Consolidated General Election November 4, 2014 Certified Results, http://sbcvote
.com/Elect/Resources/Results11_2014/results-1.htm
[https://perma.cc/R67X
-AAXC] (Measure P2014 failed).
125. COUNTY OF MONTEREY ELECTIONS, County of Monterey Presidential
General Election Results of November 8, 2016, montereycountyelections.us/Election
%20Result.htm [https://perma.cc/JA48-NH7P] (Measure Z passed). See also
Monterey County, California, Ban on Oil and Gas Drilling, Measure Z (November
2016), BALLOTPEDIA, ballotpedia.org/Monterey_County,_California,_Ban_on_Oil
_and_Gas_Drilling,_Measure_Z_(November_2016) (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
126. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA MUNICIPAL CODE TITLE 17, CHAPTER
17.06, § 17.06.110 (2016), municode.com/library/ca/alameda_county/codes/code_of
_ordinances?nodeId=TIT17ZO_CH17.06ADI_17.06.100HITEOIGAOPEF [https:
//perma.cc/F5PS-S87V] (prohibiting high-intensity oil and gas operations, including
use of hydraulic fracturing for well stimulation).
127. Caitlin Conrad, Two Oil Companies Suing Monterey County Over
Measure Z, KSBW8 (Dec. 16, 2016), ksbw.com/article/two-oil-companies-suingmonterey-county-over-measure-z/8506187 [https://perma.cc/HXT4-FTFC]; Bree
Zender & Greta Mart, Oil Companies Sue Monterey County Over Measure Z,
KCBX News (December 15, 2016), kcbx.org/post/oil-companies-sue-montereycounty-over-measure-z [https://perma.cc/VL2M-29AF].
128. Caitlin Conrad, Big Oil Files Suit Against Monterey County Over
Measure Z, KSBW8 (Dec 16, 2016), ksbw.com/article/big-oil-files-suit-againstmonterey-county-over-measure-z/8506033 [https://perma.cc/8UKB-2KE4].
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fracturing will go forward, but the prohibition on new oil and gas wells is
blocked.129
In addition to bans using direct democracy, several California cities
have also voted to prohibit hydraulic fracturing. The Beverly Hills City
Council voted on May 6, 2014 to ban hydraulic fracturing within the
city.130 In addition, Los Angeles and Santa Cruz have adopted moratoria
on the practice.131
H. Texas
In 2014, voters in Denton, Texas, approved a ballot proposition that
prohibited hydraulic fracturing within city limits.132 The next day, the
Texas Oil and Gas Association and the Texas General Land Office brought
suits against Denton challenging the ban.133 The suits alleged that the ban

129. Roberto M. Robledo, Monterey County Sued Over Measure Z, THE SALINAS
CALIFORNIAN (Dec. 14, 2016), thecalifornian.com/story/news/2016/12/14/montereycounty-sued-over-measure-z/95451866/ [https://perma.cc/58UJ-X5UP].
130. BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA CITY CODE TITLE 10, § 10–5–324 (2014),
sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/index.php?book_id=466 [https://perma.cc/MB3PZH3A] (“[I]t shall be unlawful to use or cause to be used any land within the city
for the purpose of conducting or enabling hydraulic fracturing ”).
131. Carol Linnitt, Los Angeles Becomes Largest City to Approve Fracking
Moratorium, DESMOG (Feb. 28, 2014), desmogblog.com/2014/02/28/los-angelesbecomes-largest-city-approve-fracking-moratorium [https://perma.cc/KS6X
-3HXC]; Rory Carroll, Santa Cruz Becomes First California County to Ban
Fracking, REUTERS, May 20, 2014, reuters.com/article/california-frackingidUSL1N0O700J20140521 [https://perma.cc/DB6E-26WW]; David R. Baker, To
Fight Fracking Bans, Oil Firms Heavily Outspend Environmentalists, SF GATE,
Nov. 2, 2014, sfgate.com/politics/article/To-fight-fracking-bans-oil-firms-heavily5864369.php [https://perma.cc/DFK6-RCLS].
132. CITY OF DENTON GOV’T, City of Denton City Council Minutes (Nov. 18,
2014), denton-tx.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.php?file=denton-tx_1634b95e1d
9407f168b47b7e5f654226.pdf&view=1 [https://perma.cc/9X9F-DCXU] (council
unanimously voted to approved Ordinance No. 2014-397, which prohibits hydraulic
fracturing). See also Peggy Heinkel-Wolfe, Fracking Banned, DENTON RECORD
CHRONICLE, Nov. 5, 2014, dentonrc.com/local-news/local-news-headlines
/20141105-fracking-banned.ece [https://perma.cc/4QQ6-HYP5]; City of Denton
Fracking Ban Initiative (November 2014), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia
.org/City_of_Denton_Fracking_Ban_Initiative_(November_2014) [https://perma
.cc/BL5W-9WUP]_(November_2014) (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
133. Patterson v. City of Denton, Tex., Cause No. D–1–GN–14–004628 (Dist. Ct.
Travis Cty., Nov. 5, 2014); Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Denton, Cause No. 14–
08933–431 (Dist. Ct. Denton Cty., Nov. 5, 2014). See also Peggy Heinkel-Wolfe,
Denton Sued Over Fracking Ban Ordinance, DENTON RECORD-CHRONICLE, Nov. 5,
2014, dentonrc.com/local-news/local-news-headlines/20141105-denton-sued-overfracking-ban-ordinance.ece [https://perma.cc/8AWZ-ULSX].
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was preempted by state law; was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable;
and was inapplicable to state-owned lands.134
In response to the Denton ban, the Texas legislature passed House Bill
40 on May 4, 2015, and the Governor signed the bill into law on May 18,
2015.135 House Bill 40 ensured exclusive jurisdiction to the state to
regulate oil and gas operations and expressly preempt local regulations—
including bans on hydraulic fracturing.136 On June 16, 2015, the Denton
City Council officially repealed the ban after House Bill 40 rendered the
ordinance unenforceable.137
IV. ANTI-OIL AND GAS GROUPS ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT
REPRESENTATIONAL DEMOCRACY: COLORADO AS THE EXAMPLE
When anti-industry groups failed to have their elected officials ban
hydraulic fracturing, they attempted to circumvent the process. Colorado
provides the bellwether example of using direct democracy to attempt to
further regulate or even prohibit hydraulic fracturing.
Groups have attempted to use the direct voting process to amend state
constitutions, create laws, and dictate policy at the state level. The same
process has been used for ballot initiatives at the county and local levels.
However, the use of these ballot initiatives tends to contradict the
underlying purposes of direct democracy existing since the late 1800s and
early 1900s. Direct democracy was not originally intended to create a
mechanism for a vocal minority to overrule the elected officials, but
merely as a process that the populous could propose measures when the
legislature refused to act.138
Natural resource extraction built Colorado. The first oil well drilled
west of the Mississippi River was in Florence, Colorado in the 1860s,
approximately forty miles southwest of Colorado Springs.139 Since that
time, the oil and gas industry has become a vital contributor to the
Colorado economy. In 2014, Colorado’s upstream and midstream
134. Patterson, Cause No. D–1–GN–14–004628 at *4–5; Texas Oil & Gas
Ass’n, Cause No. 14–08933-431 at *10–11.
135. Tex. H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015).
136. Id.
137. CITY OF DENTON GOV’T, City of Denton City Council Minutes (June 16,
2015), denton-tx.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.php?file=denton-tx_33b709690fe3
f3d2ac8314293178fb16.pdf&view=1 [https://perma.cc/H6ES-DPL5]. See also Max
B. Baker, Denton City Council Repeals Fracking Ban, STAR-TELEGRAM, June 16,
2015, http://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/barnett-shale/article24627469
.html [https://perma.cc/5PS4-7P3P].
138. See Persily, supra note 37, at 41–42.
139. COLO. OIL & GAS ASS’N, History Of The Second Oldest Oilfield In The
United States (2012), coga.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/History-of-FlorenceField.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB5L-9HKP].
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industry—drilling, extraction, support activities, pipeline construction and
transportation—recorded $15.8 billion in production value, and accounted
for over 38,000 jobs with an average annual wage in excess of $105,000.140
The upstream and midstream industry contributed nearly $4.1 billion in
employee income to Colorado households and nearly $1.2 billion in public
revenue streams.141
This growing economy, partially driven by the oil and gas industry’s
productivity, has caused a huge population expansion, including areas
with active oil and gas development.142 Partially due to lack of public
understanding of the nature of mineral rights, several communities have
exhibited frustration at discovering their new homes, schools, and
playgrounds are in proximity to active oil and gas developments. Many
new residents, in connection with well-funded anti-industry groups and in
contrast to Colorado’s rich history in natural resource development, view
oil and gas development in their newly developed communities as a threat.
Thus, anti-industry groups have made every effort at the legislative,
judicial, and ballot-initiative levels to eliminate the industry from the state.
Up until the most recent election in Colorado, citizens had two options
to utilize direct democracy to circumvent the legislative process—the
initiative and the referendum process. Under Article V, § 1(1) of the
Colorado Constitution, the legislative power of the state is vested in the
elected legislative body, but “the people reserve to themselves the power
to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject
the same at the polls independent of the general assembly ”
Through an initiative, the citizens can either enact a new law or
directly amend the Colorado Constitution.143 Until 2016, the standard for
enacting legislation, which could be modified by the legislature, and the
Constitution, which could not be easily modified or overruled by the
legislature, were the same. This meant that the vast majority of citizen
initiatives were constitutional amendments.
Unsatisfied with the failure to pass legislation in 2012, anti-industry
individuals proceeded to attempt implementation of statewide bans using
direct democracy. In the 2014 election, opponents of hydraulic fracturing
140. UNIV. OF COLO. LEEDS SCH. OF BUSINESS RESEARCH DIV., Oil and Gas
Industry Economic and Fiscal Contributions in Colorado by County (2014),
coga.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/COGA-2014-OG-Economic-Impact-Study
.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDL3-RCPT] [hereinafter COGA Study].
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Sharon Dunn, Weld County Tops State in Population Growth,
Ranks No. 4 in Nation, GREELEY TRIBUNE, Mar. 24, 2017, greeleytribune.com
/news/business/weld-tops-state-in-population-growth-hits-no-4-in-nation/ [https:
//perma.cc/5UBZ-4Q2V].
143. COLO. CONST., art. V, § 1(2), (3); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1–40–101 to –135
(2010).
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sought to put numerous constitutional initiatives on the ballot. Two
initiatives that met the signature requirement, which would have placed
them on the ballot, were particularly threatening to the industry. The first,
Initiative #88, sought to establish a 2,000-ft. setback for new oil and gas
wells from occupied structures, essentially an attempt to re-write the
COGCC’s setback regulations.144 The second initiative, Initiative #89,
sought to allow more restrictive local regulations to supersede existing
state regulations.145 Ultimately, opponents and supporters of these
initiatives and competing pro-industry ballot initiatives came to an
agreement to keep the proposals from being placed on the ballot.146 A
compromise orchestrated by Governor Hickenlooper formed a nineteenperson Oil and Gas Task Force with representatives inside and outside the
industry. The Oil and Gas Task Force was charged with crafting
recommendations on potential new oil and gas related legislation to
address the anti-industry groups and local governments’ concerns.147 In
turn, proponents of the competing ballot initiatives agreed to withdraw all
industry-related proposed ballot initiatives for the 2014 election.148
Although the Oil and Gas Task Force submitted nine recommendations
on new legislations, anti-industry groups were unsatisfied with their
compromise.149 Despite the earlier negotiations and the extensive
investment made in the Oil and Gas Task Force, and failure of their
legislative efforts, the anti-industry groups again attempted to effectuate
their policy goals through direct democracy. Two new amendments to the
144. See COLO. TITLE SETTING BD., In the Matter of the Title, and Ballot Title,
and Submission Clause for Proposed Initiative 2013–2014 #88 (2014), http://www
.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2013
-2014
/88Rehearing.pdf [https://perma.cc/N734-MKWF]; see also Court Order, In the
Matter of the Title, and Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for Proposed Initiative
2013–2014 #88 (Colo. 2014) (No. 2014–SA–125), https://www.courts.state.co
.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/initiatives/2013-14/14SA125
/Final%20order.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H9A-QYDS] (affirming the actions of the
title board).
145. In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission Clause for 2013–2014 #89, 328
P.3d 172 (Colo. 2014).
146. Colorado Ballot Initiatives 88, 89 Pulled Today, OIL & GAS 360 (Aug. 4,
2014), http://www.oilandgas360.com/colorado-ballot-initiatives-88-89-pulled-today/
[https://perma.cc/AL57-5Q7E] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
147. Mark Jaffe, Hickenlooper Names Task Force to Defuse Drilling Land-Use
Conflicts, DENVER POST, Sept. 8, 2014, denverpost.com/2014/09/08/hickenloopernames-task-force-to-defuse-drilling-land-use-conflicts/ [https://perma.cc/7MWNP9T4].
148. Id.
149. Cathy Proctor, Hickenlooper’s Oil and Gas Task Force Advances 9
Recommendations, DENVER BUS. J., Feb. 25, 2015, http://www.bizjournals.com
/denver/blog/earth_to_power/2015/02/hickenloopers-oil-and-gas-task-forceadvances-9.html [https://perma.cc/YJ9S-2Y8D].
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Constitution were proposed during the 2016 election. The first, Initiative
#75, sought to authorize local governments to prohibit or limit oil and gas
development and allow more restrictive local regulations to supersede
existing state regulations.150 The second, Initiative #78, sought to establish
an even more restrictive 2,500-ft. setback for new oil and gas development
facilities and allow local governments to establish larger setbacks.151 If
enacted, this 2,500-ft. setback would have effectively ended oil and gas
production in Colorado.152 Ultimately, neither initiative received sufficient
signatures to be placed on the 2016 Ballot.153 Thus, these direct democracy
efforts failed.
However, in 2016, Colorado took a huge step forward in preventing
special interest groups, such as anti-oil and gas industry organizations,
from utilizing the direct democracy process, not as the safety valve for
which it intended, but as the main tool driving individual political agendas.
On November 8, 2016, Colorado citizens passed Proposition 71, popularly
referred to as the “Raise the Bar” amendment, which made it harder to
amend Colorado’s State Constitution through citizen initiatives.154 For
constitutional amendments only, Proposition 71 raised the standard both
in terms of the signatures required to get a constitutional amendment on
the ballot for a vote, and the vote required to pass that amendment.155
However, the relatively low burden remains in place for legislative
initiatives, which still leaves the industry vulnerable to attack by special

150. Elizabeth Titus & Hogan Lovells, Update on Proposed Anti-Oil and Gas
Ballot Initiatives, COLO. OIL & GAS ASS’N, http://www.coga.org/ogballotinitiatives/
[https://perma.cc/AC84-L7N5] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (focusing on Measure
2015-2016 #75); Court Order, In the Matter of the Title, and Ballot Title, and
Submission Clause for Proposed Initiative 2015–2016 #75 (Colo. 2016) (No. 2016–
SA–70), https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme
_Court/initiatives/2015-16/16SA70/4-14-16%20court%20order.pdf [https://perma.cc
/U92E-733S].
151. See Titus & Lovells, supra note 150 (focusing on Measure 2015-2016
#78); Court Order, In the Matter of the Title, and Ballot Title, and Submission
Clause for Proposed Initiative 2015–2016 #78 (Colo. 2016) (No. 2016–SA–71),
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/ini
tiatives/2015-16/16SA71/4-14-16%20court%20order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DYT-2MUT].
152. See COGA Study, supra note 140.
153. Jeff Todd, Empty Petition Boxes Put Anti-Fracking Initiatives In Doubt
(Aug. 9, 2016), CBS DENVER, denver.cbslocal.com/2016/08/09/empty-petitionboxes-anti-fracking-initiatives-doubt/ [https://perma.cc/JMT8-8G4C].
154. Kevin Simpson, Amendment 71: Coloradans approve making constitution
harder to amend, DENV. POST, Nov. 8, 2016, http://www.denverpost.com/2016
/11/08/colorado-amendment-71-constitutional-amendments-election-results/ [https:
//perma.cc/Y6V6-SFE5].
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interest groups, depending on the makeup of the legislature after any given
election cycle.
CONCLUSION
After anti-industry groups failed to achieve their agenda through the
courts and their elected officials, they turned their focus to the direct voter
and election process in an attempt to effectuate a change in policy and
regulation of the oil and gas industry. Although Colorado voters made it
more difficult for special interests groups to manipulate the Colorado
Constitution, it can be expected that special interest groups, including antiindustry groups, will continue utilizing direct democracy as an end-runaround the legislative and legal process.
As many have suggested, the ballot initiative crowd has become more
energized, active, and indeed professional, when it comes to their attempts
to circumvent the fundamental democratic process.156 One cannot walk
down the 16th Street Mall in downtown Denver during election season,
without being approached by a ballot initiative operative seeking
signatures or financial contribution for their cause.
Although the United States Supreme Court has refused to reject the
ballot initiative process, labeling it a “political question,” the very nature
of the direct democracy and the attempt to use the ballot process to
overturn legislative actions and judicial decisions regarding regulation of
oil and gas is nothing more than a ploy by small and vocal environmental
activists to attempt to circumvent the fundamentals of a republican
government established by the U.S. Constitution.

156. Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Institutional Causes of California’s Budget
Problem, 2 CAL. J. OF POL. AND POL’Y 3 (2010).

